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Visible inequality breeds more inequality 
[published in slightly revised version as a News & Views article in Nature 526, 333-
334 (2015)].  
 
Experiments suggest that, when people can see wealth inequality in their social 
network, this propels further inequality through reduced cooperation and reduced 
social connectivity. See Letter p. xxx 
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Inequality is a growing concern in many societies1. Like most important social 
phenomena, it is a complex issue that has many interacting sources and 
consequences1–3. To understand inequality and its dynamics over time, multiple 
theoretical and empirical approaches are necessary. In this issue, Nishi et al.4 (p. 426) 
use laboratory-style experiments (conducted online) to study how the visibility of 
wealth inequality in people’s social environment shapes the behavioural dynamics of 
inequality. The attraction of an experimental approach is that it allows the control of 
factors that are inherently uncontrollable in naturally occurring data. Crucially, for 
example, the experimenter can control the initial level of inequality and see how 
inequality evolves as a function of people’s behaviour alone5,6.  
 
Nishi and colleagues’ experimental model used an assessment of people’s willingness 
to contribute to public goods to test how initial wealth inequality and the structure of 
	the social network influence the evolution of inequality. The researchers were 
particularly interested in the role of visibility of wealth — can mere observation of 
your neighbour’s wealth lead to more inequality over time even if such information 
does not change economic incentives? Visible wealth might have a psychological 
effect by triggering social comparisons and thereby influencing economic choices that 
have repercussions for inequality3.  
 
In their online laboratory, the researchers endowed all participants with tokens, worth 
real money. The endowment differed across individuals and treatments: in a treatment 
without inequality, all participants initially received the same number of tokens; in a 
low-inequality treatment, participants had similar but different initial endowments; 
and in the high-inequality treatment there was a substantial starting difference 
between participants. The groups typically comprised 17 people arranged at random 
in a social network in which, on average, about five people were linked 
(‘neighbours’). In each of the ten rounds of the following game, participants had to 
decide whether to behave pro-socially (‘cooperate’) by reducing their own wealth by 
50 tokens per connected neighbour to benefit each of them by 100 tokens, or to 
behave pro-selfishly (‘defect’) by keeping their tokens for themselves. These 
decisions had consequences for accumulated wealth levels and inequality. At the end 
of each round, the subjects learned whether their neighbours had cooperated or 
defected and 30% of participants were given the opportunity to change their 
neighbour, that is, to either sever an existing link or to create a new one.  
 
A crucial manipulation in this experiment was wealth visibility. Under invisible 
conditions, the participants could only observe their own accumulated wealth. Under 
	visibility, they could see the accumulated wealth of their connected neighbours but 
not the whole network. Thus, in total there were six conditions: three levels of initial 
wealth inequality in each of the two visibility conditions.  
 
The results are complex but illuminating. The authors find that under high initial 
wealth inequality, visibility of neighbours’ accumulated wealth increases inequality 
over time relative to the invisibility condition, although under both visibility 
conditions, absolute inequality decreases over time. The reason for the relative 
increase under visibility is that inequality drops only moderately, whereas under 
invisibility the reduction in inequality is substantial. In the case of initial wealth 
equality, inequality increases similarly in both visibility conditions. Under moderate 
initial inequality, visibility leads to a small increase in inequality relative to 
invisibility. 
 
Visibility of wealth also leads to lower social welfare, as measured by overall wealth. 
By the end of the experiment, total accumulated wealth was substantially larger in the 
three conditions with invisible wealth than in the three conditions with visible wealth. 
The reason is that cooperativeness was lower under the condition of visible wealth 
compared to invisible wealth, and there were fewer links in the social network  
 
The most striking insight from these findings is the effect of wealth visibility on the 
dynamics of inequality: conspicuous inequality breeds more inequality. Although 
visibility of wealth does not change economic incentives in this experimental 
scenario, it invites social comparisons that, for various reasons3,7 worth exploring 
further, undermine cooperation and diminish social ties. This observation adds to 
	existing8,9, but sparse, evidence that public information about individual payoffs leads 
to more competition, which in a public-goods setting triggers more ‘free-riding’ by 
individuals (defecting when others cooperate), to improve their own payoffs.  
 
Nishi and colleagues’ findings raise several intriguing methodological questions for 
future studies. For example, how important is the social network and its rewiring for 
the main results of this experiment? Modelling interactions using a social network is 
certainly realistic, but is it crucial for the emergence of visibility effects in inequality? 
Another question concerns the result that visibility of wealth matters much less under 
initial equality of wealth. This is surprising, given that inequality of wealth increases 
over time and visibility effects should kick in, according to the results from the 
treatments with initial inequality. It is possible that these experiments, which used 
only ten iterations, might have been too short to allow for visibility effects arising as 
inequality grows.   
 
The results also suggest substantive questions worthy of further research. As well as  
understanding the role of visibility of wealth (or payoffs more generally) for 
cooperation, it would be interesting to gather evidence about how people’s pro-social 
attitudes are affected by the ever-increasing amount of information about other 
people’s consumption (as a signal of their wealth)10, which nowadays is spread at an 
almost global scale by social media. And how do visibility and social comparisons 
affect the dynamics of inequality when the relevant game is not one of cooperation 
but of competition? This is interesting because, in many interactions in our modern 
societies, not only initial endowments (wealth) matter but also resources that are 
allocated as people compete for scarce rewards — good jobs, for instance11. 
	 
These are just some questions that can be investigated with the experimental model 
put forward by Nishi and colleagues. Their most general contribution is to showcase 
the power of experiments to contribute to our understanding of the behavioural 
dynamics of inequality.  
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